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Abstract: There are some issues about how companies consider their financing. These issues are related
to the amount, source, type, and the structure of  such financing. So far, there is no uniform model that is
able to explain how companies deal with these issues. There are three competing, dominant theories of
financing decision making, i.e. the Pecking Order Theory, the Static Trade-off  Theory, and the Agency
Model Theory. This study attempts to explore which theory explains the best way for companies in the
consumer industry to decide their financing method. There are five hypotheses to be tested in this study.
Using data from public listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2011, it seems
that the Agency Model Theory is more dominant than the other two theories in explaining the way
companies fulfill their financing needs.
Abstrak: Terdapat beberapa isu terkait bagaimana perusahaan mempertimbangkan kebutuhan pendanaan
mereka. Isu-isu yang terkait dengan pertimbangan tersebut adalah mengenai jumlah, sumber, jenis, dan
struktur pendanaan. Sejauh ini, tidak ada model yang seragam yang mampu menjelaskan bagaimana
perusahaan menangani isu tersebut. Terdapat tiga teori yang saling bersaing dan dominan terkait keputusan
pendanaan, yaitu teori pecking order, static trade-off, dan agency model. Studi ini berusaha menggali teori mana
yang terbaik menerangkan cara perusahaan di dalam industry konsumsi memutuskan pendanaan mereka.
Terdapat lima hipotesis yang diuji di dalam studi ini. Dengan menggunakan data perusahaan terbuka di
Bursa Efek Indonesia dari tahun 2008 sampai 2011, tampak bahwa agency model theory lebih dominan
dalam menjelaskan cara perusahaan memenuhi kebutuhan pendanaan mereka dibandingkan dengan kedua
teori lainnya.
Keywords: agency model theory; capital structure; corporate finance; pecking order theory
(POT); trade-off theory
 JEL classification: G00
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Introduction
There are some issues about how com-
panies decide their financing methods. Such
a decision is not only concerned with the
amount that can be obtained but also with
the source, type, and the structure of  the fi-
nancing. In dealing with these issues, compa-
nies may consider some of the underlying
factors in financing, such as the availability
of funds, the cost of capital, and the ability
to control the company.
A theoretical point of view is needed
to explain how and why practitioners behave
in a certain way in fulfilling their financing
needs. For example, some Chief  Financial
Officers (CFOs) and boards of directors may
decide their financing needs on the basis of a
benchmarking approach, i.e. by following
how their peers determine their financing
needs, especially for the capital structure.
This may be one reason why companies in an
industrial group tend to have similar capital
structures because they adjust their capital
structures to reflect those of  their peers.
Other CFOs determine the capital structure
on the basis on their capacity to generate in-
come or cash flows to fulfill their obligations.
The more the companies have the capacity
to generate an operating cash flow, the greater
is their capacity to service their borrowing.
Academicians provide several alterna-
tives to explain practitioners’ behavior in such
cases. There are three competing, dominant
theories that explain how financing needs and
capital structures should be determined. The
theories are the Pecking Order Theory
(POT), the Agency Model Theory (AMT) of
capital structure, and the Static Trade-off
Theory (STT). According to the (POT), a
company attempts to obtain capital on the
basis of the ease with which it can be ac-
cessed, starting with the easiest source. The
CEO and executive directors put some ef-
fort into negotiating with the non-executive
directors or with the board of commission-
ers regarding how much net profit should be
retained, as retained earnings, and how much
is to be distributed as dividends. If  retained
earnings, which are the easiest source of fi-
nancing that can be obtained, are exhausted,
then they must start searching for other
sources of  financing.
The AMT on Capital Structure empha-
sizes the idea of improving the discipline of
the board of directors in managing their com-
pany. A company with a higher profit needs
to be closely controlled to assure that the di-
rectors put the maximum effort into protect-
ing the interests of the shareholders by maxi-
mizing the value of the company and by us-
ing the company’s resources wisely. One way
of improving their discipline is by asking
creditors to provide loans to the company
and, as a consequence, closely control it. The
creditors need to assure that the company is
well managed and, as a result, their loans are
safe.
The STT, on the other hand, assumes
that a company attempts to maintain a cer-
tain Debt to Equity Ratio (DER). Compa-
nies who apply this theory believe that a cer-
tain ratio contributes to the efforts to maxi-
mizing the value of  the company, as long as
such a ratio results in the minimum level of
the Weighted Average Cost of  Capital (WACC
or simply COC) or the maximum value of
the firm.
The use of these models by practitio-
ners may vary from one region to another,
and across time (Rafiq et al. 2008). As an im-
plication, some researchers have focused
their studies on specific industries
(Shanmugasundaram 2008; Jahan 2014;
Kühnhausen and Stieber 2014; Mwangi et al.
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2014). In the case of Indonesia, choosing a
basic industry sector for this study was based
on the fact that the chosen industry was not
heavily regulated and played in a free, com-
petitive, market. No single company used in
this study belongs to the government. This is
one indication that the industry works under
market-mechanisms. Therefore, the CFOs or
Board of Directors have the freedom to de-
cide the sources of financing and their capi-
tal structure based on the companies inter-
ests.
Based on the aforementioned argument,
this study attempts to answer the following
question: is there any tendency for compa-
nies that operate in the basic industry sector
to decide their sources of financing and their
capital structure? This study indicates that
the AMT seems to be more dominant than
the other two theories.
This paper is organized as follows. The
first section is the introduction. It is followed
by a brief description on the previous stud-
ies on the Pecking Order, Agency Model, and
STT of  Capital Structure. This is then fol-
lowed by the proposed models and hypoth-
eses. The next section elaborates the data em-
ployed in this study and their analysis. This
paper closes with the conclusion.
Previous Studies
Papers on testing the existence of only
two theories, i.e. the POT and STT, are quite
common. Myer (1984) tested whether com-
panies tended to use the Pecking Order or
Static Trade-off  Theories. Myer argues that
the STT emphasizes the existence of an op-
timal capital structure between debt and eq-
uity by emphasizing the optimum benefit and
costs of  various sources of  financing. The
absence of  an optimal capital structure is
assumed to follow the POT.
Graham and Harvey (2001), also tested
the existence of those theories through a sur-
vey sent to CFOs. They emphasize the way
that CFOs consider certain factors when they
look for capital, whether they strictly set a
target ratio, moderately set a target ratio, or
do not have a target ratio. They reveal that
not all CFOs have a target capital structure.
While only ten percent of CFOs have a very
strict capital structure, at least nineteen per-
cent of  the CFOs surveyed did not have a
target ratio at all. Their research also indi-
cates the existence of both the Pecking Or-
der as well as the STT in the actual decision
making process for financing.
Graham and Harvey (2002) and
Acaravci (2015) also conducted research to
prove the Pecking Order and Static Trade-
off Theories by designing one model that was
able to explain the existence of both theories
by employing several explanatory factors.
Some of those factors explain the existence
of  the POT, while others explain the exist-
ence of  the STT. Some other studies, such as
the one conducted by Rafiq et al. (2008),
employed the same factors to indicate the
existence of either the Pecking Order or
Static Trade-off  Theories, depending on the
signs of those factors, i.e. positive or nega-
tive signs. The models may have employed
parametric as well as nonparametric models.
Some studies indicate the tendency to-
ward a certain DER. Frank and Goyal (2004)
found that a company tends to have similari-
ties in the growth of debt and equity at the
same pace. In other words, CFOs of those
companies behave as if they use the STT as
the basis of their financing decisions by main-
taining the DER at a constant level.
However, following Wurgler (2002) and
Welch (2003), the DER may deviate from its
long target ratio, because of  stock price move-
ment, the timing of equity issuance, and the
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timing of debt issuance. Therefore, the DER
based on market value as the dependent vari-
able needs to consider the market-to-book
ratio and the interest rate as the explaining
factors of  DER changes.
Myer and Majluf (1984), were followed
by some fellow researchers, such as Frank
and Goyal (2008); Neus and Walter (2008);
and Getzmann et al. (2010) who placed em-
phasis on the Asymmetric Information Con-
dition. This condition leads to the possibility
of  moral hazards and adverse selections. This
means that firms generally give priority to
internal rather than external sources of fi-
nancing because internally generated capital
is easier to negotiate and acquired than capi-
tal from outside, regardless of the quality of
the companies. Based on this argument, com-
panies tend to follow the POT in deciding
their capital needs.
The studies aforementioned have simi-
larities in terms of  the variables and models
applied. Most of them employed the change
in debt as the dependent variable. Cash flow,
profit, capital expenditure, and changes in
working capital were the explanatory vari-
ables. A few of  those studies added other in-
dependent variables in order to improve the
robustness of  the studies.
AMT, as an alternative to the Capital
Structure Theory, stands by the principle that
a company needs to incur costs to reduce it’s
agency problem (Sen and Oruc 2009). Ac-
cording to Vo and Nguyen (2014), this agency
problem can be dealt with by two mecha-
nisms. The first mechanism is by allowing top
management to hold a portion of shares in
the company to make them take proper care
of the company (see also Morck et al. 1988).
The second mechanism is by increasing the
level of debt in order to improve the market
discipline (see also Jensen, 1986). Sharehold-
ers expect the senior management team to
maximize the firm’s value and shareholders’
wealth. However, the senior management
may behave in such a way as to exploit the
opportunity to maximize their own interests.
Therefore, shareholders need a model to con-
trol them in such a way that they are forced
to behave on behalf of the shareholders’ in-
terests. This is the role of  debt in a company.
The AMT puts the role of debt differ-
ently from that in the Pecking Order and
Static Trade-off  Theories. Under the AMT,
debt becomes an instrument to control man-
agement. Under the POT, debt becomes a
sources of capital after internal sources of
capital are exhausted. Under the STT, debt
becomes the balancing source of capital to
keep the DER constant at a certain target
ratio.
The AMT argues that the larger, more
profitable companies tend to increase their
debt. By doing so, creditors, as external par-
ties, put a lot of effort into controlling the
way senior management manage the compa-
nies. Even though the interests of  the credi-
tors are mainly for the safe and timely repay-
ment of their loan, the way management con-
trol and manage certain areas of the company
are forced to be in accordance with the inter-
ests of shareholders such as the companies’
financial performance, the role of  fiduciary,
and the sustainability of  the companies. The
involvement of creditors may be costly but
the costs may not exceed the benefits ex-
pected by the shareholders.
Hypotheses and Models
Pecking Order Theory (POT)
To prove the existence of  the POT, this
study employed three models. The first model,
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i.e. the simple one, used the financing defi-
ciency on the change in debt. The financing
deficiency is defined as the condition in which
the investment required by the company ex-
ceeds the cash flow generated internally by
the company. The source of  the internal cash
flow is profit. As the profit is not sufficient
to fulfill the capital need, it implies that the
company needs to receive a financial injec-
tion from outside. The source of such financ-
ing could be in terms of  either debt or eq-
uity.
The way a company fills the deficiency,
or the gap between profit and investment re-
quirement, depends on several factors. In the
first case, the deficiency of a company ex-
ists, i.e. earnings after tax or the net profit of
company i at year t (EAT
i,t
) is positive, but
less that the investment required at time t.
Under this circumstance, the company needs
to acquire debt to fulfill the gap. At a certain
level of investment need, the lower the
EAT
i,t
, i.e. the wider the gap, the larger the
amount of debt is needed, D
i,t
, to fill the
gap. In other words, the lower the EAT
i,t
, the
higher the D
i,t
.
In the second case, the EAT
i,t
 exceeds
its investment requirement at year t. Accord-
ing to POT, the company puts EAT
i,t
 as the
first priority to fulfill the investment required.
The excess of EAT
i,t
 would be idle if it is
kept in the company. Therefore, idle EAT
i,t
will be used to repay a part of the debt in the
first place. Therefore, the larger the EAT
i,t
the lower is the debt. In other words, EAT
i,t
has the opposite movement in the change in
debt at time t (D
i,t
). The higher the EAT
i,t
,
the lower the D
i,t
.
In the third case, EAT
i,t
 is negative, i.e.
the company suffers losses and does not gen-
erate an internal cash flow to fulfill the in-
vestment required. POT argues that the com-
pany will attempt to obtain new debt to fill
the investment required. Therefore, the EAT
t,i
is negatively related to D
i,t
.
The relationship of EAT
t,i
 and D
i,t
, can
be expressed mathematically as follows:
D
i,t
= a + bEAT
i,t
+ 
t
...................... (1)
(-)
where
D
i,t
= the change in debt of company i at
period t;
EAT
t,I
= the profit after tax of company i at
period t;

t
= the error term at time t.
Hypothesis1 (H
1
): The earnings after tax of  a com-
pany has a negative relationship
with the change in debt.
Equation (1) can be slightly extended
by putting the dividend under the following
argument. Suppose a company has a positive
EAT
i,t
, i.e. the company generates a profit at
time t. Under most terms of  credit, the com-
pany has to fulfill its repayment obligation
of  the existing debt as its first priority. In this
case, the total debt decreases or D
i,t
 is nega-
tive. The remained profit will be reinvested
in the company, and the residual of  the profit
will be distributed as dividend. Under these
circumstances, the larger EAT
i,t
, may result
in a larger Div
i,t
 and at the same time lower
the debt.
The relationship of EAT
i,t
 and
Dividend
i,t
 toward D
i,t
 can be expressed as
follows:
D
i,t
= a + bEAT
i,t
 + cDiv
i,t
 + 
t
...........(2)
(-) (-)
The aforementioned leads to the hy-
pothesis formulation to prove the existence
of  POT as follows.
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Hypothesis2 (H
2
): The earnings after tax and pay-
ment of dividends by a com-
pany have a negative relation-
ship with the change in debt.
The above model can be extended by
putting in three other independent variables.
Rafiq et al. (2008) applied the portion of tan-
gible assets as an explanatory variable. They
argued that more tangible assets provided
better opportunities for companies to borrow
because they can use those tangible assets as
collateral. This study does not employ the tan-
gibility of assets as an independent variable.
Instead, the change of fixed and current as-
sets are employed to explain the behavior of
the change in debt. The increase in either fixed
or current assets can be fulfilled, partially or
wholly, by debt because those assets can be
used as collateral.
Rafiq et al (2008) also applied the loga-
rithm of asset as an explanatory variable. The
purpose of using this variable was mainly to
accommodate the size effect. Large compa-
nies tend to have more opportunities to bor-
row. They also proposed the impact of  asym-
metric information on the amount of  debt.
In a large company, insiders have more infor-
mation than outsiders. Moreover, the price
of  equity in large firms tends not to be un-
dervalued. Under this condition, management
prefer to finance companies by using equity.
As a consequence, the increase in debt is not
as much as the increase in firm size.
D
i,t
= a + b
1
EAT
i,t
 + b
2
Div
i,t
 + b
3
FA
i,t
 +
b
4
WC
i,t
 + b
5
LA
i,t
  + 
t
 ..................(3)
where,
D
i,t
= the change in debt,
FA
t,i
= the change in fixed asset,
WC
t,i
= the change in working capital,
Div
t,i
= the dividend, and
LA
t,i
= the logarithm of the total book value
of assets of company i at period t.
The last variable is to control the inducement
of  the size of  the company.
POT expects the following results.
FA
t,i
 and WC
t,i
 are expected to have a posi-
tive relationship with D
t,i
, in the sense that
the demands for large investment tend to
push the company to increase its borrowing.
The increase in fixed and current assets pro-
vides a larger amount of assets that are avail-
able as collateral. Therefore, the increase in
both types of assets may induce the increase
of debt.
Dividend, D
t,i
 is expected to have a
strong negative correlation with Div
t,i
 be-
cause a large dividend indicates a large
amount of  excess funds. Therefore, the com-
pany does not need to borrow money. A
smaller dividend, or the absence of such, in-
dicates a shortage of funds and therefore the
company needs to borrow money and hence
the D
t,i
 increases.
The coefficient of LA
t,i
 only indicates
the accessibility of the creditor based on the
size of  the company. Larger companies tend
to exploit equity financing, instead of debt.
They use debt to fill any lack of equity fi-
nancing. Therefore, LA
i,t
 is expected to have
a weak, positive relationship with the D
t,i
.
In summary, based on Equation (3),
POT expects the following results:
D
i,t
= a + b
1
EAT
i,t
 + b
2
FA
i,t
 + b
3
WC
i,t
(-)   (+)      (+)
b
4
Div
i,t
 + b
5
LA
i,t
  + 
t
 ..................(4)
  (-)       (+)
Based on the Equation (4), the hypoth-
esis to explore the evidence of POT is as fol-
lows:
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Hypothesis3 (H
3
): The change in debt has a strong
negative relationship with the
dividend but a moderate or low
positive relationship with the
change in fixed assets and the
change in working capital.
Agency Model Theory (AMT)
As aforementioned, the AMT argues
that a company with a higher profit encour-
ages the management to borrow funds from
creditors. In this case, shareholders feel more
secured in terms of  the safety of  their wealth
held by the management team because they
are under the scrutiny of  the creditors. The
higher portion of debt in their capital, the
tighter the creditors supervise and monitor
the management.
The above argument can be expressed
statistically as follows:
D
i,t
= a + b
1
EAT
i,t
 + 
t
.........................(5)
(+)
where
D
i,t
= is the change in debt; and
EAT
i,t
= the earnings after tax or net profit of
company i at time t.
As mentioned earlier, under AMT, sharehold-
ers attempt to control the company through
creditors. The larger the profit gained by the
company, the larger the debt of  the company.
Creditors always put efforts into monitoring
the company closely to assure that the com-
pany maintains its creditworthiness through
it’s financial, operational, strategic, and mana-
gerial healthiness.
The hypothesis related to Equation (5)
is as follows:
Hypothesis4 (H
4
): The change in debt has a strong
positive relationship with the
earnings after tax.
Following Dudley (2007), Leland
(1994), and Breman and Schwartz (1978), a
more complete form of  AMT is modeled as
follows:
D
i,t
= a + b
1
EAT
i,t
  + b
2
FAR
i,t
 +
(+) (+)
b
3
LA
i,t
 +
i,t
   .................................(6)
(+)
FAR
i,t 
is the fixed asset ratio of  company
i at year t, i.e. the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets. This variable has two meanings.
Firstly, a higher ratio indicates the higher capi-
tal requested. Under AMT, a company tends
to finance the investment in fixed assets from
debt in order to enhance the control. Dudley
(2007), Leland (1994), and Brennan and
Schwartz (1978) put another meaning to this
ratio. According to them, FAR
i,t
 represented
bankruptcy costs. The higher the ratio, the
lower the bankruptcy costs. It is because
creditors have collateral in case of bank-
ruptcy. Therefore, a higher FAR
i,t
 makes
creditors feel comfortable to provide loans
and, as a result, increase debt.
The variable LA
i,t
 in AMT has a similar
meaning to that in POT. Large companies
tend to have better access to creditors. There-
fore, the amount of debt is expected to have
a positive relationship with the size of the
company.
Hypothesis5 (H
5
): The change in debt has a strong
positive relationship with the
earnings after tax, and a moder-
ate, positive relationship with the
fixed asset ratio.
Static Trade-off  Theory (STT)
The hypotheses for the STT are devel-
oped as follows. A company with a huge
EAT
i,t
 may use this net profit in different
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ways, depending on the opportunities avail-
able to it. Under the condition of the absence
of investment opportunities, the company
tends to distribute the money as dividends or
keep it in the company as a reserve. How-
ever, if the company has an opportunity to
invest, it will deploy the money to be invested
in fixed as well as current assets. The larger
the investment opportunity to be captured,
the larger the EAT
i,t
, portion will be to be
allocated for investment. According to the
STT, every investment must be financed by
equity and debt to keep the capital ratio
stable. In other words, the larger the EAT
i,t
,
the larger the debt to fulfill the demand for
investment.
A company that suffers losses can do
nothing to grasp an investment opportunity.
The only possibility it has is to divest or sell
some assets to fulfill its need for cash. Under
a loss condition, the total book value of eq-
uity decreases. Under STT, the company has
to reduce its debt to keep the DER constant.
Therefore, the sale of assets will provide the
cash needed for operations and, at the same
time, to repay a part of the debt. This leads
to the following conditions. The first condi-
tion, negative EAT
i,t
, is accompanied by nega-
tive D
i,t
 when the company suffers losses
and, at the same time, reduces its debt. In
other words, the EAT
i,t
 has a positive rela-
tionship with D
i,t
. The second condition, the
EAT
i,t
 is negative but the company does not
want to reduce its size, i.e. the company does
not want to sell a part of its assets and does
not reduce its debt. This is unlikely to hap-
pen under STT because this decision leads
to the deviation of the DER from its target.
The above arguments can be expressed
mathematically as follows:
D
i,t
= a +bEAT
i,t
 + 
t 
.......................... (7)
(+)
Equation (7) proposes that a higher
EAT
i,t
 provides more equity for investment.
Therefore, the debt must be increased to ful-
fill the investment in order to keep the DER
at a certain or targeted level. The lower EAT
i,t
also leads to a lower need for additional debt.
Therefore, the positive relationship is ex-
pected to be considerably strong.
The above explanation leads to the fol-
lowing hypothesis under STT
Hypothesis 6 (H
6
): The change in debt has a moder-
ate, positive relationship with
earnings after tax.
A company may suffer losses but finds
an investment opportunity and needs to in-
vest in fixed or current assets. Under STT,
the company may seize the investment op-
portunity by issuing shares to obtain new eq-
uity and, at the same time, obtain a new loan
to accompany the new shares to keep the
DER constant. This decision leads to a posi-
tive relationship between the change in debt
and the change in equity. This relationship
can be modeled in a statistical Equation 8 as
follows:
D
i,t
= a +bE
i,t
 + 
t 
............................. (8)
(+)
With E
i,t
 being the change in book value of
equity of company 
i
 at time 
t
. The hypoth-
esis, then, is as follows:
Hypothesis 7 (H
7
): The change in debt has a strong,
positive relationship with the
change in equity.
E
i,t
 depends on internal equity financ-
ing and external equity financing. Internal
equity financing is reflected by the EAT
i,t
 and
DIV
i,t
. External equity financing is reflected
by NEF
i,t
, the amount of new equity financ-
ing from external sources by the issue of new
shares. Hence,  E
i,t
 in model (8) can be re-
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placed by EAT
i,t
, DIV
i,t
,and NEF
i,t
. Further-
more, other variables employed in model (4)
are also applicable to test STT. Therefore,
Equations (7) and (8) can be combined and
extended as Equation 9.
D
i,t
= a + b
1
EAT + b
2
Div
i,t
 + b
3
NEF
i,t
 +
(+) (-) (+)
b
4
FA
t,i
 + b
3
WC
t,i
 +
(+) (-)
b
5
LA
t,i
 + 
t 
.................................(9)
    (+)
Under STT, the dependent variable D
i,t
is expected to have a strong relationship with
the first three independent variables. The in-
crease in debt is needed if the company has
retained earnings, i .e. earnings after tax
(EAT
i,t
) minus dividends (Div
i,t
). It is because
if the company does not increase its debt,
the capital structure will change and this situ-
ation violates (STT). At the same time, the
increase in new equity financing (NEF
i,t)
,
must be responded to by an increase in debt,
to keep the DER stable.
The change in debt is also expected to
have a positive relationship with the change
in fixed assets as well as the change in work-
ing capital. Every penny invested in fixed and
current assets must be financed by both eq-
uity and debt. Therefore, the increase in as-
sets must be responded to by the increase in
debt. This argument also applies the other
way around. The decrease in assets needs to
be responded to by reducing both equity and
debt to keep their ratios as constant as pos-
sible.
The relationship between the change in
debt and the size of the company under STT
is similar to that under POT. The hypothesis
is, then, as follows.
Hypothesis8 (H
8
): The change in debt has a strong,
positive relationship with earn-
ings after tax, new equity financ-
ing, changes in fixed assets, and
changes in working capital; a
strong , negative relationship
with dividends, and a moder-
ate, positive relationship with
the size of company.
Data and Analysis
Following Rafiq et al. (2008),
Shanmugasundaram (2008), Jahan (2014),
Kühnhausen and Stieber (2014), and Mwangi
et al (2014) aforementioned, this study fo-
cused on testing the existence of  POT, AMT,
and STT in an industry or strategic group in a
certain time period. A strategic group con-
sists of companies that have similarity in
terms of  their business aspects, mainly in their
types of products, markets, and business
models. Some studies indicate that compa-
nies within a strategic group tend to have a
similarity in their capital structures due to
several factors, such as the behavior of credi-
tors (Sen and Oruc 2009). According to them,
the deviation from the industry average of
capital structure is overcome by adding or
reducing the debt. As a result, this action has
an effect on the market’s reaction (see, for
example, Siegfried 1984; Harris and Raviv
1991; and Hatfield et al. 1994). However,
some studies also indicate that certain stra-
tegic groups tend to have diverse financing
resources (Almazan and Molina 2005; Kim
2008; Shanmugasundaram 2008). Various
factors influence the divergence of capital
structure (see, for example, Lev 1974;
Mandelker and Rhee 1984; and Bradley et al.
1984).
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This study focused on the consumer
goods industry in Indonesia due to two main
reasons. Firstly, all the companies are inde-
pendent companies, especially for deciding
the amount, sources, and structure of  their
capital. This means that each of the boards
of directors of these companies has the free-
dom to decide the capital required because
of very limited regulations stipulated by the
government. There are an appropriate num-
ber of listed companies in this industry and
none of  them are state-owned companies.
Therefore, their funding decisions are ex-
pected to follow market mechanisms and, as
a result, the behavior of the board of direc-
tors may reflect the theories to be tested.
Moreover, the industry is in a competitive
environment, meaning that their top manage-
ment tend to make the best decisions for the
companies. This study attempted to use for
its data source as many public companies pro-
ducing consumer goods which are listed on
the Indonesian Stock Exchange as possible.
After being screened, based on the availabil-
ity of the data, there were 24 companies suit-
able for inclusion in this study.1
This study also specified the data only
from a four years period, i.e. from 2008 to
2011. The period chosen was based on the
fact that Indonesia faced an economic crisis
in 2008, caused by the impact from the
subprime mortgage crisis that started in the
United States. Therefore, companies were
expected to start preparing new financing
strategies between 2008 and 2009, as part of
their corporate strategies, to return the com-
panies to a stable condition, i.e. years 2010
and 2011. Since some variables were in the
process of change, such as the change in eq-
uity, in the end there was only a period of
three years for the data employed in this study,
i.e. the years 2009, 2010, and 2011.
Based on the industry and period cho-
sen in this study, there are 72 items of  data
available from 24 companies. However, the
absence of a time lag in the model leads to
the treatment of the data as being similar to
cross section data. Research with these 72
items of data and five independent variables
fulfills the statistical requirement. As the
panel data have the characteristics of time
series data, the robustness of the interference
is considered after regressions, i.e. whether
the error fulfills the requirement of the ro-
bustness.
Description of the Data
The description of the data is shown in
Appendix 1. The table shows the huge fluc-
tuation of the changes in debt, D
i,t
, from
negative to positive. This means that the com-
panies may have reduced their debt at cer-
tain times and increased their debt at other
times. EAT
i,t
, one of  the most important in-
dependent variables in this study, is always
positive. However, the companies sometimes
do not distribute dividends. In other words,
they tend to accumulatec their profits as re-
tained earnings.
The change of fixed and current assets
also f luctuates considerably. Negative
changes in fixed assets indicate that at least
one company reduced its size of  operations.
This reduction leads to the reduction of the
need for current assets too. It needs to be
proven whether the reduction in its opera-
tions is balanced by the reduction of its debt
or equity.
1 The companies finally selected as the samples in this study are ADES, AISA, CEKA, DLTA, DVLA, GGRM,
HMSP, INAF, INDF, KAEF, KDSI, KLBF, LMPI, MERK, MLBI, MRAT, MYOR, PYFA, RMBA, SKLT, STTP,
TCID, ULTJ, UNVR.
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Appendix 1 also shows that E
i,t
 and
NEF
i,t
 fluctuate strongly, from negative to
positive. While negative E
i,t
 shows the re-
duction in the total book value of  equity,
negative NEF
i,t
 shows the reduction in the
external equity. The external equity refers to
paid-in capital and capital in excess. A nega-
tive NEF
i,t
 may indicate that a company takes
a corporate action, such as stock buyback.
This study did not intend to conduct research
into the issue of corporate action. Instead,
this study focused on the relationships be-
tween the change in debt, on one side, and
the change in equity or net equity financing,
on the other. Suffice to say here, that those
fluctuations are interesting to explore in rela-
tion to the hypotheses under study.
This study also ran the Hausman tests
for all the hypotheses. As the first step, both
the fixed and random effects models of the
Hausman tests were conducted. For compari-
son, this study reported the results for both
the fixed and random effects models for ev-
ery model tested, as can be seen in Appendix
1, Appendix 2, and Appendix 3. Appendix 1
shows the regression results to test the hy-
pothesis of  POT, Appendix 2 to test the hy-
pothesis of  AMT, and Appendix 3 to test the
hypothesis of  STT.
The majority of the regressions fit with
the fixed effect model. Only two regressions
fit with the random effect model. The Equa-
tion 1, i.e. the regression with EAT
i,t
 as the
only independent variable in the model, indi-
cated the fitness of the random effect model
as well as the fixed effect model, as shown in
Appendix 1. The regression result showed that
EAT
i,t
 had a positive relationship with D
i,t
at a 5 percent significance level. Therefore,
both the random and fixed effect models may
be used to test the hypothesis.
The random effect model also applies
to the last model for testing STT. The last
two columns of Appendix 3 show the regres-
sion results of Equation (9) using the ran-
dom and fixed effect models. The regression
results clearly indicate that the model under
the random effect model has the significant
level of less than 1 percent while the model
under fixed effect model is not significant to
explain the relationships between the inde-
pendent variables and the dependent vari-
able. Therefore, the random effect model is
used to prove the existence of the last hy-
pothesis.
Hypothesis Testing
As formulated in the hypotheses, the re-
gression results were used to test each hy-
pothesis by looking at the signs and signifi-
cant levels of the coefficients of the inde-
pendent variables. We started with testing H
1
to H
3
, to test for the existence of  POT. The
regression results are shown in Appendix 2.
The test for H
1
 is shown in column (2) and
(3). H
1
 says that earnings after tax have a
negative relationship with the change in
debt. However, the coefficient of EAT
i,t
 was
positive and significant at a 5 percent signifi-
cance level. Since the sign and the signifi-
cance level of the coefficient were not as
expected by POT, H
1
 is not proven. Hence,
this Equation does not support the existence
of  POT.
Columns (4) and (5) of Appendix 2
show the results of regression to test the ex-
istence of H
2
. Adding DDiv
i,t
 as another ex-
planatory variable, together with EAT
i,t
, was
consistent with the above result, i.e. the non-
existence of  POT. Both coefficients of  the
independent variables were expected to be
negative, while the results were both posi-
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tive. The coefficient of EAT
i,t
 was positive
and significant at the 5 percent significance
level while the coefficient of Div
i,t
 was posi-
tive but not significant.
Columns (6) and (7) of Appendix 2 pro-
vide the regression results to test H
3
. The
coefficient of WC
i,t
 was the only one that
was strongly significant, i.e. at the 1 percent
significance level. However, the sign was the
opposite to the expected sign for POT. This
means that the test to H
3
 was also consistent
with the above two results, i.e. the nonexist-
ence of  POT.
The above tests clearly indicate that
POT was not evident. In other words, it seems
that POT does not fit in with the way the
management of the companies within the
consumer goods industry decided their capi-
tal needs. Even though a company has a high
profit, the companies do not merely rely on
the profit to fill the gap between the capital
required and the capital available.
The tests for the existence of AMT were
conducted by running the regressions that
were in relation to hypotheses (4) and (5), as
shown in Appendix 3. Columns (2) and (3)
of Appendix 3 show the results of the re-
gression of Equation (5) to prove H
4
. Hy-
pothesis4 (H
4
)says that the change of debt
has a strong positive relationship with the
earnings after tax. The coefficient of EAT
i,t
was positive and significant at the 5 percent
significance level. Based on this regression,
it seems that AMT exists.
Columns (4) and (5) show the regres-
sion results to prove H
5
, saying that the
change in debt has a strong positive relation-
ship with the earnings after tax, and a posi-
tive relationship with the fixed asset ratio.
Column (4) shows that the coefficients of
EAT
i,t
 and FAR
i,t
 were both positive but none
of them were significant. Column (5) shows
slightly different results from column (4). The
coefficient of EAT
i,t
 was positive and had a
1 percent significance level, i.e. very strong,
while the coefficient of  FAR
i,t
 was negative
but not significant. In this case, it seems that
H
5
 is moderately accepted. Hence, H
5
 sup-
ports the existence of AMT but not very con-
clusively. Based on the results of  testing both
H
4
 and H
5
, it can be concluded that AMT
seems to exist.
Appendix 4 shows the regression results
to test for the existence of  STT. Columns (2)
and (3) show the regression results to test H
6
,
saying that the change in debt has a moder-
ate, positive relationship with earnings after
tax. The results of the regression support this
hypothesis, i.e. the coefficient of EAT
i,t
 was
positive and had a 5 percent significance level.
This means that higher profit is followed by
higher debt.
Columns (4) and (5) of Appendix 4 pro-
vide different evidence. H
7
 says that the
change in debt has a strong, positive relation-
ship with the change in equity. Column (4)
indicates that the coefficient of E
i,t
 was sig-
nificantly negative, while column (5) indicates
that the coefficient of E
i,t
 was positive but
not significant. From the sign and significance
level point of  view, it is clear that H
7
 is not
accepted. This also means that STT is not
supported by this model.
Columns (6) and (7) of Appendix 4
show the regression results in relation to H
8
.
This hypothesis says that the change in debt
has a strong, positive relationship with earn-
ings after tax, new equity financing, changes
in fixed assets, and changes in working capi-
tal; a strong, negative relationship with divi-
dends, and a moderate, positive relationship
with the size of  the company. The coefficients
that support the hypothesis were the coeffi-
cients of EAT
i,t
, and LA
i,t
. The other coeffi-
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cients were not as expected by STT. More-
over, the coefficient of NEF
i,t
 was negative
and significant under the random effect
model. This was the opposite to the expected
sign of  the coefficient because under STT,
higher debt has to be accompanied by higher
equity financing. Therefore, this hypothesis
was not fully accepted and, therefore, the re-
gression result only weakly supported the
existence of  STT.
Based on the above analysis on the ex-
istence of  POT, AMT, and STT, it is clear
that AMT is superior to STT and POT in the
way companies in the consumer industry in
Indonesia deal with their financing and capi-
tal structure issues. The application of  AMT
in explaining the behavior of companies’ fi-
nancing and capital structure could be as fol-
lows. Companies tend to increase their loans
when they earn profits. They do not intend
to exploit the internally generated funds to
become retained earnings. Instead, they ob-
tain new loans to fulfill their financing needs
to complement their retained earnings. This
behavior seems to be in line with STT. How-
ever, companies keep increasing their loans,
instead of increasing both loans and new ex-
ternal equity at a certain set proportion. They
prefer to increase their loans by keeping paid
in capital at a certain level. Based on AMT,
the increase in loans when the companies are
growing shows the aim of using their credi-
tors’ ability to control the companies.
The last important point to note from
this study is the relationships between D
i,t
and FA
i,t
 and WC
i,t
. Large companies have
more opportunity and access to acquire debt.
These loans need collateral. There are vari-
ous types of collateral used in Indonesia, such
as fixed assets, deposits in terms of  back-to-
back loans, and personal guarantees. The
weak relationship between the changes in
fixed assets as well as current assets and the
increase in debt may indicate that some com-
panies are able to use something other than
fixed and current assets as collateral.
Conclusion
Based on the aforementioned analysis,
it may be concluded that: firstly, the POT
does not work for companies within the con-
sumer industry. In other words, their manag-
ers are not tempted to exploit profits to ful-
fill their financing needs. Supposing the POT
worked, this would indicate that the manage-
ment tended to exploit the sources of funds
based on how easily the source of funds was
accessible. As the POT does not apply to the
consumer industry, that kind of  behavior is
not implemented in the industry. The man-
agement do not only put their efforts into ob-
taining capital based on how easily the capi-
tal is accessed, but there is at least one other
consideration.
Another consideration, based on the
evidence from the STT, is that the manage-
ment needs to exploit other sources of capi-
tal, i.e. debt. The purpose of applying the STT
is to minimize the cost of capital and, at the
same time, to maximize the value of  the firm
by keeping the composition of debt and eq-
uity, or the DER at the most optimum level.
Based on interviews with some financial
managers, the increase in the use of the STT
is probably due to the increase in the num-
bers of financial managers and CFOs with
an educational background from financial
academies. The increases in equity are bal-
anced by the increased debt. This study does
not involve itself in the study of the opti-
mum DER. However, the significance of the
increase in equity as well as the increase in
net profits in relation to the increase in debt
indicates such an effort.
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However, there is still another consid-
eration, even more important than the value
maximizing consideration, i.e. the control of
companies by outsiders, mainly by their credi-
tors. The AMT emphasizes the governance
model, in the sense that the separation be-
tween principals and agents creates difficul-
ties for principals to control the behavior of
the agents. Principals have limited access to
companies, therefore they encourage compa-
nies to borrow funds. Creditors always ask
for as much information as they need before
approving and disbursing any loans. Creditors
want to make sure their funds are safe by
evaluating the past performance of  borrow-
ers, evaluating the future or expected perfor-
mance of the borrowers, and by designing a
contract to assure that the borrowers’ man-
agement behave properly to make sure the
funds are secured and the companies are
managed according to the investors’ criteria.
In this sense, shareholders are indirectly pro-
tected by the presence of creditors in the
companies.
Therefore, the order that the theories
are implemented in is as follows: The most
important is the AMT, followed by the STT,
and the least important is the POT.
Note that this order may be generalized
for companies within the consumer industry
in the Indonesian market. However, further
generalization still needs other studies to be
conducted in order to assure the validity and
applicability of the findings when applied to
other areas. There are some research alterna-
tives, the first is to conduct similar studies
based on different industries in the Indone-
sian market. If the findings of such studies
are similar to the findings in this study, the
generalization may be applied to the Indone-
sian market. If those findings diverge and
differ, there may be a uniqueness to the fi-
nancing decisions within different industry
groups.
Secondly, studies could be conducted in
similar industries in other markets, such as
Singapore, Malaysia, and other neighboring
countries. The third is to conduct studies in
those countries in different industries. It may
also be interesting to conduct similar studies
in developed countries, in order to compare
the results of such studies against the results
of studies in Indonesia as a developing coun-
try. The purpose is to compare whether there
are similarities and differences in financing
decisions between developed vis a vis a de-
veloping country or countries.
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APPENDIX 1. Descriptive Statistics of  the Variables Under Study
D
i,t
EAT
i,t
Div
i,t
E
i,t
FA
i,t
(Rp Millins) (Rp Millins) (Rp Millins) (Rp millions) (Rp Millins)
Mean 168,547 924,427 907 599,152 188,896
Minimum (2,463,664) 2,126 0 (364,482) (236,673)
Maximum 5,116,374 8,051,057 16,150 14,825,554 4,080,407
Standard 897,383 1,727,430 2,900 1,986,117 549,494
Deviation
WC
i,t
FAR
i,t
L A
i,t
NEF
i,t
(Rp Millins) (percentage) (Rp Millins) (Rp Millins)
Mean 337,243 31.08% 13 264,322
Minimum (1,538,147) 0.91% 11 (176,614)
Maximum 8,423,025 62.03% 16 12,916,171
Standard 1,244,192 13.81% 2 1,608,241
Deviation
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APPENDIX 2. Continued
Notes:
Appendix 2 provides the regression results in relation to H
1
, shown under columns POT Model 1, hypothesis 2, under
columns POT Model 2, and H
3
, under columns POT Model 3. The equations of POT model 1 is
(-)                     
,, ttiti bEATaD 
, POT model 2 is 
(-)          (-)                    
,,, ttititi cDivbEATaD 
, and POT model 3 is
)(             (-)             )(            )(            (-)                      
,5,4,3,21,

 tititititti LAbDivbWCbFAbEATbaD 
. D
i,t
, the dependent variable, is the change in
debt, EAT
i,t
, earnings after tax of  company i at time t, DIV
i,t
, dividend of  company i at time t,  FA
i,t
 change in fixed
assets of company i at time t, WC
i,t
 the change in working capital of company i at time t, and LA
i,t
 natural logarithm
of Assets of company i at time t. The table shows regressions of every equation using both random and fixed effect
models. The figures in the table are the coefficients, and the figures in the parentheses are t-statistics, with (***)
significance at 1 percent, (**) significance at 5 percent, (*) significance at 10 percent. The signs (-) and (+) in the table are
expected signs according the hypotheses.
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APPENDIX 3: The Regression Results to Test the Hypotheses of  Agency Model Theory
Component AMT Model 1 AMT Model 2
Random Effect Fixed Effect Random Effect Fixed Effect
Constant 39550.3 -360876.2 -432529 -5477774
EAT
i,t
0.14(2.0625)** 0.57(2.4241)** 0.13(1.3088) 0.48(1.9716)*
Expected sign (+) (+) (+) (+)
FAR
i,t
240630 -1823820
(0.2767) (-0.9682)
Expected sign (+) (+)
LA
i,t
31444.04 444750.10
(0.2949) (1.5097)
Expected sign (+) (+)
R2 5.53% 48.50% 5.78% 50.99%
Adjusted R2 4.18% 22.21% 1.62% 22.68%
Hausman test (p value) 0.0557 0.1233
Notes:
Appendix 3 provides the regression results in relation to H
4
, shown under columns AMT Model 1, and H
5
, under
columns AMT Model 2. The equations of AMT model 1 is 
)(                     
,,

 ttiti bEATaD 
 , and AMT model 2 is
)(            )(              )(                     
,3,2,1,

 ttitititi LAbFARbEATbaD 
. D
i,t
, the dependent variable, is the change in debt, EAT
i,t
, earn-
ings after tax of  company i at time t, FAR
i,t
 the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets of  company i at time t, and LA
i,t
 natural
logarithm of Assets of company i at time t.The table shows regressions of every equation using both random and fixed
effect models. The figures in the table are the coefficients, and the figures in the parentheses are t-statistics, with (***)
significance at 1 percent, (**) significance at 5 percent, (*) significance at 10 percent. The signs (-) and (+) in the table are
expected signs according the hypotheses.
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